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Toxic TORTS AND MASS TORTS
Brent M. Rosenthal*
URING the Survey period, courts in Texas have continued to
address a variety of substantive and procedural issues in toxic
tort and mass tort litigation. The decisions of the Texas courts in
toxic and mass tort cases have been marked by caution and skepticism.
Courts have been reluctant to expand the scope of jurisdiction and the
duties owed to workers and consumers, have regarded theories of scien-
tific causation in toxic tort cases with mistrust, and have discouraged the
aggressive use of aggregation devices, such as the class action and consoli-
dation to resolve mass tort cases. Rather than distinguish toxic and mass
tort cases from other types of cases, Texas courts appear to increasingly




In American Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman,' the Texas Su-
preme Court considered whether a Maryland company could constitu-
tionally be haled into a Texas court to defend a class action brought by
military veterans allegedly exposed to and injured by biological weapons
during the Persian Gulf War. The veterans claimed that the defendants,
including American Type Culture Collection, Inc. ("ATTC"), supplied
material to the government of Iraq for use in biological and chemical
weapons. 2 ATrC, "a nonprofit.., repository center for living microorga-
nisms, viruses, and cell lines,"'3 maintained its "principal place of business
in Rockville, Maryland" and had no offices or property in Texas. 4 It had,
however, sold products to Texas residents for at least eighteen years.5 Its
Texas sales accounted for 3.5% of its total annual sales and 5% of its total
U.S. sales, generating approximately $350,000 in income. 6 It also pur-
* Shareholder, Baron & Budd, P.C., Dallas, Texas, and Lecturer in Law on Mass
Tort Litigation, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law. The author grate-
fully acknowledges the assistance of Misty Farris and Carla Burke of the firm of Baron &
Budd, P.C., in preparing this Survey.
1. Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801 (Tex. 2002).
2. Id. at 804.
3. Id.





chased $378,000 of supplies from Texas vendors over a five year period.7
ATTC filed a special appearance challenging the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction over it by the Texas court.8 The trial court denied the special
appearance and the Houston Court of Appeals for the First District af-
firmed the denial, noting ATITC's "numerous and repetitive" sales in
Texas.9 Justice O'Connor dissented from the court of appeals' denial of
rehearing en banc, providing the basis for jurisdiction in the Texas Su-
preme Court.' 0
The supreme court restated the requirement that a nonresident's con-
tacts must demonstrate that it "'purposefully availed' itself of the privi-
lege of conducting activities within Texas."11 The supreme court found
that ATCC purposefully structured its transactions not to avail itself of,
but to avoid, the benefits and protections of Texas law.12 The supreme
court cautioned that although the quantity of ATCC's contacts with Texas
may suggest a significant relationship with Texas, it is the quality of those
contacts that is relevant to a jurisdictional analysis. 13 Finding that there
was no basis for jurisdiction, the supreme court unanimously reversed
and rendered judgment dismissing the case against ATCC for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction. 14
B. LIMITATIONS
In Bates v. Schneider National Carriers, Inc.,15 the First District Court
of Appeals in Houston reversed the trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment for defendants on the statute of limitations because the court found
a question of fact concerning whether the alleged nuisance was "perma-
nent" or "temporary." Community residents filed suit for damages
caused by "emissions of noise, light, chemicals, dust, odors, and various
other substances" from a local manufacturing facility.16 If the nuisance
was permanent, the statute of limitations had expired because more than
two years had passed since the nuisance began; if the nuisance was tem-
porary, however, the plaintiffs could recover damages incurred in the two
years preceding the filing of suit.' 7 The court considered the plaintiffs'
affidavits, which contained arguably conflicting statements that the
problems were "constant" and that the plaintiffs' symptoms occurred dur-
7. Id. at 808.
8. Id. at 804.
9. Id. at 804-05.
10. Id. at 805. Although the Texas Supreme Court ordinarily lacks jurisdiction over
interlocutory appeals, it has jurisdiction over an appeal if "the justices of [the] court of
appeals disagree on a question of law material to the decision." TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN.
§ 22.001(a)(1) (Vernon 1998).
11. Am. Type Culture, 83 S.W.3d at 806.
12. Id. at 809.
13. Id. at 809-10.
14. Id. at 810.
15. Bates v. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, No. 01-00-01132-CV, 2002 WL 356714 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] March 7, 2002, no pet.).
16. Id. at *t.
17. Id. at *2.
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ing periods of rain, high humidity, or when the wind was from the south.' 8
Noting that permanent and temporary nuisances can be distinguished
based on the "abatability" of the nuisance, the court observed that the
affidavit of plaintiffs' expert contained recommendations for changing
the defendant's operations "to prevent or reduce the nuisance condi-
tions."'19 Based on this conflicting testimony within the affidavits, the
court of appeals found a genuine issue of material fact concerning the
permanent or temporary nature of the nuisance and reversed the judg-
ment of the trial court.20
C. DUTY AND DEFENSES
In In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation,21 the fed-
eral district court presiding over the multidistrict litigation involving the
contraceptive Norplant granted summary judgment on the vast bulk of
the claims in favor of the manufacturer based on the learned intermedi-
ary doctrine and the lack of proof of causation. The plaintiffs alleged that
the prescription drug Norplant-a contraceptive capsule implanted into
the skin-caused them to develop a variety of diseases and conditions. 22
Of the 976 adverse reactions alleged by the various plaintiffs, twenty-six
were identified in the product labeling provided by the manufacturer Wy-
eth.23 Wyeth moved for summary judgment on all claims. As to the
plaintiffs who alleged that they had sustained one or more of the twenty-
six adverse reactions listed on the package insert, Wyeth argued that the
learned intermediary doctrine barred the claims.24 Under that affirma-
tive defense, the supplier of a prescription drug satisfies its duty to warn
of the potential dangers of its product by providing adequate warnings to
the prescribing physician. 25 As to the plaintiffs alleging that they had de-
veloped one or more of the roughly 950 adverse reactions not listed in the
package insert, Wyeth argued that the plaintiffs had presented no scientif-
ically reliable evidence of general causation.2 6
Because the court, pursuant to multidistrict transfer, had before it Nor-
plant cases from all fifty states, it surveyed the law of every state and
determined that, with one exception, every state recognized a learned in-
termediary defense that would bar claims based on an adverse reaction
that had been identified in the package insert.27 The exception is New
Jersey, which does not apply the learned intermediary doctrine when the
prescription drug manufacturer advertises its product directly to the ulti-
18. Id. at *2-3.
19. Id. at *4.
20. Id.
21. In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Tex.
2002).
22. Id. at 800.
23. Id. at 799-800.
24. Id. at 800.
25. Id. at 803.
26. Id. at 800.
27. Id. at 811-12.
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mate consumer, as Wyeth had done with Norplant. The court determined
that cases governed by New Jersey law were not subject to application of
the learned intermediary doctrine and scoured its docket to identify cases
governed by New Jersey law. The court ultimately determined that the
learned intermediary defense would not apply to the claims of any plain-
tiff who had Norplant implanted in New Jersey.28 As to all other plain-
tiffs alleging an adverse reaction identified in the package insert, the
court granted summary judgment based on the learned intermediary
doctrine. 29
The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Wyeth in all
cases in which the plaintiffs alleged that they had developed one or more
of the 950 reactions not identified in the package insert, finding that
plaintiffs had presented no admissible proof that Norplant actually
caused the reactions. 30 The plaintiffs resisted summary judgment, argu-
ing that (1) they needed more time for discovery, (2) they were entitled
to present lay testimony establishing their injuries and the cause of the
injuries, and (3) the criteria for determining admissibility of expert testi-
mony identified in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,31 did
not apply to such lay testimony. 32 The court rejected the plaintiffs' argu-
ments, finding that it had provided them ample time for discovery and
that the lay opinions offered by the plaintiffs were not exempt from scru-
tiny and were not scientifically reliable. 33
In Foster v. Denton Independent School District,34 the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the defendants in a
case in which an elementary school teacher claimed that she had sus-
tained injuries caused by toxic mold. The plaintiff sued her employer
school district and the installer of the HVAC unit in the school for recur-
rent headaches and respiratory problems caused by exposure to mold and
fungus growing in standing water beneath the school and dispersed
through the school by the HVAC unit.3 5 The court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's ruling that the plaintiff's claims against the school district
were barred by sovereign immunity because her claims did not fall under
the "takings" exception incorporated in article I, section 17 of the Texas
Constitution or under the "motor vehicles" exception of the Texas Tort
Claims Act. 36 In addition, the court held that the plaintiff failed to state a
claim under the Health and Safety Code because she did not allege that
the mold was present in excess of fifty-five gallons or 500 pounds. 37 The
28. Id. at 813-23, 834.
29. Id. at 828.
30. Id. at 833-34.
31. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
32. In re Norplant, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 832-33.
33. Id. at 833-34.
34. Foster v. Denton Indep. Sch. Dist., 73 S.W.3d 454 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002,
no pet.).
35. Id. at 457.
36. Id. at 460-61.
37. Id. at 463-64.
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court also found that the defendant HVAC installer had no duty, contrac-
tual or otherwise, to guarantee that the area around the school did not
-become contaminated with mold and fungus. 38 Although the mold was
distributed around the school by the HVAC unit, the HVAC unit itself
was not responsible for the growth of the mold and fungus, and thus, the
risk was too remote to create a duty on the part of the HVAC installer.39
The court therefore affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor
of both defendants.4 0
In Cook-Pizzi v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc.,41 the Amarillo Court of
Appeals affirmed summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' DTPA,
negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty claims because the
plaintiffs did not present summary judgment evidence to support those
claims. Plaintiff Cook-Pizzi, a hospital ICU nurse, was injured by fumes
after a coworker poured hydrogen peroxide and other chemicals into a
clogged sink.42 Cook-Pizzi and her husband sued Van Waters, the bulk
supplier of the hydrogen peroxide to the hospital, and Degussa and Du-
Pont, two suppliers of hydrogen peroxide to Van Waters, alleging that
each defendant failed to warn of the dangers of using hydrogen peroxide
to clear clogged drains.4 3 The court quickly dispensed with Cook-Pizzi's
DTPA counts, finding that because she presented no summary judgment
evidence that the hospital bought the hydrogen peroxide for her benefit,
she was not a "consumer" and had no standing to bring a claim under the
Act.44 The court then rejected Cook-Pizzi's common law strict liability
and negligence claims. The court found that the defendants discharged
their duty to warn of the hazards of their products by furnishing material
safety data sheets to the hospital, the adequacy of which the plaintiffs did
not challenge in the trial court.4 5 Finally, the court upheld the trial
court's rejection of Cook-Pizzi's breach of warranty claims because Cook-
Pizzi presented no evidence that the hospital relied on the defendant sup-
pliers to select or furnish a product that would be suitable for cleaning
clogged drains.4 6
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY AND
PROOF OF CAUSATION
During this Survey period, appellate courts were especially active in
scrutinizing the admissibility of expert causation testimony in toxic tort
cases. Two appellate courts reversed jury verdicts for the plaintiffs based
38. Id. at 466-67.
39. Id. at 467.
40. Id.
41. Cook-Pizzi v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., No. 07-01-0115-CV, 2002 WL 398797
(Tex. App.-Amarillo March 13, 2002, pet. denied).
42. Id. at *1.
43. Id. at *2.
44. Id. at *5.




on the erroneous admission of expert causation testimony. In Coastal
Tankships, U.S.A., Inc. v. Anderson,47 the Houston Court of Appeals for
the First District, sitting en banc, reversed a jury verdict in favor of a
plaintiff who claimed that her decedent developed bronchiolitis obliter-
ans organizing pneumonia ("BOOP") as a result of his exposure to naph-
tha while working as a seaman. After his exposure to naphtha, the
seaman began to suffer "headaches, shortness of breath, nausea, dizzi-
ness, shoulder stiffness, and tightness in his chest."' 48 He was referred to a
pulmonary doctor who arrived at a "differential diagnosis" that his expo-
sure to naptha caused his BOOP.49 The pulmonary doctor based his di-
agnosis on his physical examination of the seaman, test results showing an
inhalation injury, the timing of the illness, the seaman's medical history,
and exclusion of other possible causes.50 The seaman brought claims
against the shipowner for "negligence under the Jones Act and unseawor-
thiness under general maritime law .-51 The jury awarded damages, the
trial court entered judgment based on the jury's verdict, and the ship-
owner appealed, challenging the admissibility and sufficiency of the doc-
tor's opinion on causation.52
Because differential diagnosis is a clinical diagnostic technique
"'outside the hard science context," 53 a majority of the court of appeals
used a "translation" of the Daubert inquiry to determine whether the ex-
pert's differential diagnosis was reliable and admissible.5 4 The revised
admissibility inquiry considers "(1) whether the field of expertise is a le-
gitimate one; (2) whether the subject matter of the expert's testimony is
within the scope of that field; and (3) whether the expert's testimony
properly relies upon and/or utilizes the principles involved in the field."'55
Considering the differential diagnosis under this framework, the majority
concluded that a "properly conducted and explained differential diagno-
sis is not 'junk science"' and "should be considered reliable enough to
assist a fact finder in understanding certain evidence or determining cer-
tain fact issues."15 6 The court held, however, that a differential diagnosis
can provide proof only of specific causation, not general causation, "be-
cause a differential diagnosis presumes that chemical X can cause condi-
tion Y generally, but does not itself so prove. '5 7 The court concluded
that there was no evidence in the record to show general causation and
47. Coastal Tankships, U.S.A., Inc. v. Anderson, 87 S.W.3d 591, 594 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (en banc).
48. Id. at 595.
49. Id. at 596-97.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 594.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 600 (quoting Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998, no
pet.)) (emphasis omitted).
54. Id. at 601.
55. Id. (discussing Nenno, 970 S.W.2d 549).
56. Id. at 604-05.
57. Id. at 608-09 (following Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d 183,
191 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. denied)).
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held that in the absence of such evidence, the pulmonary doctor's opinion
on causation was unreliable and should not have been admitted.58 Justice
Brister issued a concurring opinion taking issue with the majority's gen-
eral observations that an opinion based on a differential diagnosis need
not satisfy all of the DaubertlHavner criteria 59 and that proof of general
(as opposed to specific) causation is always required in a toxic tort case. 60
Justice Cohen dissented, arguing that the seaman's medical records, en-
tered without sufficient objection, and the naphtha material safety data
sheets provided legally sufficient evidence of general causation. 61
In Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Navarro,62 the San Antonio
Court of Appeals reversed a two million dollar award to a plaintiff who
claimed that her exposure to diesel exhaust while working as a rail yard
clerk caused her to develop multiple myeloma. The court held that the
causation testimony of the plaintiff's industrial hygienist was unreliable
because (1) he relied on a single study to perform exposure estimates, (2)
he did not address the cautions articulated in that study for using the
estimates, (3) he shifted his initial estimates up dramatically by changing
the job classification he used for comparison and by using the total partic-
ulate mass measure rather than the measure of extracted diesel particles
("adjustable extractable mass measure"), (4) he used an EPA document
marked "do not cite or quote" to support an estimate based on the odor
threshold for diesel, and (5) he lacked professional experience with diesel
exhaust exposure.63 Because the other experts relied on these exposure
estimates, their opinions were likewise unreliable. 64 But the court also
analyzed their opinions individually and found them lacking. The testi-
mony of the plaintiff's epidemiologist was unreliable because (1) he used
two studies to find a causal relationship when the study authors them-
selves were unwilling to find one, (2) he ignored other studies that he
conceded showed no association between exposure and disease, (3) he
could not testify what level of exposure created the risk, and (4) he had
no experience with diesel exhaust and multiple myeloma.65 The court
also judged unreliable the testimony of the plaintiff's oncologist/hematol-
ogist because (1) he could not state what exposure level was necessary to
cause multiple myeloma, (2) he did not specify particular types of cancer
that are caused by diesel exhaust exposure, and (3) he provided no sup-
port for his theory that diesel exhaust could reach the bone marrow
though inhalation, ingestion, or dermal absorption.66 The testimony of
the plaintiff's toxicologist that "there is no safe level of exposure to cer-
58. Id. at 610-12.
59. Id. at 615-16 (Brister, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 616-17 (Brister, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 619-24 (Cohen, J., dissenting).
62. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Navarro, 90 S.W.3d 747 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no
pet.).
63. Id. at 756.





tain components of diesel exhaust" was rejected as an unacceptable "type
of reasoning. '67 Because of these flaws, the experts should not have been
permitted to testify, and the plaintiff failed to prove general causation. 68
The plaintiff's evidence of specific causation was also insufficient because
the studies cited failed to show a doubling of the risk of multiple my-
eloma in people exposed to diesel exhaust and because the plaintiff's ex-
perts failed to rule out alternative causes of multiple myeloma.69
Less conspicuously, Texas appellate courts also affirmed decisions to
exclude expert testimony as within the trial court's discretion. In Neal v.
Dow Agrosciences LLC,70 the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's exclusion of expert testimony that an infant's pre- and post-natal
exposure to the pesticide Dursban caused him to develop a fatal brain
tumor. The plaintiffs, parents of the infant, had been exposed to Dursban
during the mother's pregnancy when it was used to eliminate ants in the
plaintiffs' apartment.71 The plaintiffs' expert based his opinion of causa-
tion on medical records of the infant, an interview with the mother, and
four studies which he testified showed a significant association between
"'extermination for insects' and the risk of brain cancer. 72 Reviewing
the trial court's decision to strike the testimony, the court of appeals itself
analyzed the studies and concluded that no study cited by the expert sup-
ported his opinion of "general causation," that is, that Dursban is capable
of causing brain cancer in the general population. 73 The court noted that
although one of the studies found an increased risk of pediatric brain
tumor from exposure to flea/tick sprays or foggers, the study itself drew
no conclusion but stated only that "'there appear[ed] to be enough evi-
dence to warrant further investigation.'1, 74 Another study cited by the
expert reported an increased incidence of all cancers among children ex-
posed to pesticides but found the results "inconclusive" and suggested
that the increased incidence of cancer could be attributable to a greater
inclination of parents of children with cancer to recall pesticide expo-
sure. 75 Finding that the expert's opinion of causation was "not supported
by reliable evidence," the court affirmed the exclusion of the testimony
and the resulting summary judgment for the defendants. 76
In Regan v. Schlumberger Technology Corp.,7 the First District Court
of Appeals in Houston upheld the trial court's decision to exclude an
opinion of the plaintiff's expert witness that her decedent's exposure to
67. Id. at 758.
68. Id. at 758-59.
69. Id. at 758.
70. Neal v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 74 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.).
71. Id. at 470-71.
72. Id. at 473.
73. Id. at 473-74.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 474.
76. Id.
77. Regan v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., No. 01-00-00026-CV (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] Nov. 1, 2001, pet. denied) (not designated for publication), 2001 WL 1344077.
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asbestos caused his fatal lung cancer. The court first considered whether
the trial court abused its discretion by entertaining the defendants' mo-
tion to exclude the opinion on the day of trial and by deciding the motion
without holding a full evidentiary hearing. Observing that "[j]ustices and
scholars" have "strongly urged" courts to conduct early pretrial hearings
on the admissibility of scientific evidence, the court nonetheless con-
cluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the
defendants' motion to exclude on the day of trial without receiving oral
testimony.78 The court noted that the plaintiff had prior notice of the
motion, had planned to offer the expert's opinion by deposition and not
by live testimony, and declined the judge's offer to continue the hearing
until the next morning so that she could make a more detailed defense of
her expert's opinion. Turning to the merits, the court held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in finding the expert's testimony of cau-
sation unreliable and inadmissible. 79 The plaintiff's expert relied on a
single twenty-two-year-old study in support of his opinion that although
the decedent did not have asbestosis, his lung cancer was attributable to
asbestos exposure. 80 Although the expert admitted that several studies
had found an increased risk only in persons with asbestosis, he was una-
ble to identify by name any recent studies that supported his position that
lung cancer could be attributed to asbestos exposure in the absence of
asbestosis.81 The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in finding this testimony inadequate to support the admission of the
expert's opinion. 82
In Dupuy v. American Ecology Environmental Services Corp.,83 the
Tyler Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion by excluding the conclusory causation testimony of the plaintiffs'
expert. The expert opined in an affidavit that the plaintiffs' exposure to
various chemicals while cleaning a hazardous waste tank on the defen-
dant's premises caused their injuries. The plaintiffs' expert failed, how-
ever, to support his opinion; instead, he offered only a bald assertion that
"'[t]he facts and data underlying [his] opinions herein are the type gener-
ally and reasonably relied on by experts in forming opinions." 84 The
court of appeals noted that the expert's affidavit included no "objective
facts" upon which the expert based his opinions, such as the concentra-
tion or duration of exposure or even the names of the chemicals to which
the plaintiffs were exposed. 85 The information in the expert's affidavit
was thus insufficient to meet plaintiffs' burden of establishing the reliabil-
78. Id. at *3.
79. Id. at *9-13.
80. Id. at *9.
81. Id. at *9-10.
82. Id. at *13.
83. Dupuy v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., No. 12-01-00160-CV (Tex. App.-Tyler
2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 1021342.
84. Id. at *4-5 (first alteration in original).
85. Id. at *4.
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ity of the expert's opinion.8 6
III. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. CLASS ACTIONS AND CONSOLIDATION
In Schein v. Stromboe,8 7 the Texas Supreme Court added to its juris-
prudence discouraging the use of class actions to resolve personal injury
or consumer tort claims. s8 The plaintiffs in Schein alleged that the dental
practice management software developed and sold by the defendants was
defective and sought to impose liability on the defendants for "breach of
contract, breach of express and implied warranties, fraudulent and negli-
gent misrepresentations, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices-Consumer Protection Act." 89 They also sought certification
of a nationwide class of purchasers of the software. 90 The trial court cer-
tified the class, and the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed on interlocu-
tory appeal.91 A majority of the supreme court determined that it had
jurisdiction over the defendants' interlocutory appeal because the court
of appeals' opinion conflicted with Southwestern Refining Co. v. Bernal,92
in that it did not provide a specific explanation of how the claims could be
tried together. 93 The supreme court also found that the court of appeals'
standard of review was insufficiently "rigorous" under Bernal because it
granted the trial court's ruling the benefit of every presumption.94
The supreme court found numerous problems with the certification or-
der itself. First, certification under Rule 42(b)(1) was not proper because
the plaintiffs did not show how prosecution of individual claims sepa-
rately would "establish incompatible standards of conduct" for defend-
ants or threaten the interests of other class members.95 Certification was
improper under Rule 42(b)(4) because the plaintiffs had not shown that
common questions predominated over individual ones; for example, not
every class member relied on the defendant's misrepresentations. 96 Al-
though it refused to state a bright-line rule that certification is never
proper when individual reliance is a necessary element of the plaintiffs'
claims, the supreme court held that "the plaintiffs in this case have failed
to show that individual issues of reliance do not preclude the necessary
finding of predominance under Rule 42(b)(4). ' '97 Likewise, the plaintiffs
86. Id. at *5.
87. Schein v. Stromboe, 46 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 103, 2002 WL 31426407 (Oct. 31, 2002).
88. See Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon, 22 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2000); Southwestern Ref. Co.
v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. 2000); Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson, 22 S.W.3d 398 (Tex.
2000).
89. Schein, 2002 WL 31426407, at *1.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Southwestern Ref Co., 22 S.W.3d at 425.
93. Schein, 2002 WL 31426407, at *8-9.
94. Id. at *10-11.
95. Id. at *11.
96. Id. at *13-14.
97. Id. at * 14.
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failed to show how actual damages (beyond disgorgement of the software
sale price) or exemplary and statutory damages could be determined on a
class-wide basis. 98 The plaintiffs also failed to demonstrate that applica-
tion of Texas law was proper in such a high percentage of the cases in
which common legal issues predominated. 99 Finally, the plaintiffs failed
to show that "'a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."1 00 The court was un-
convinced by the trial court's conclusion that the amount recoverable in
individual claims made those claims not economically feasible to pursue
separately. 101 The court also expressed reservations that class actions are
the most fair and efficient means of resolving such claims, approving a
"market model" rather than a "central planning model" for the resolu-
tion of mass torts.10 2 The court reversed the certification order and re-
manded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 10 3 Justice
O'Neill, joined by Justices Enoch and Hankinson, dissented, arguing that
the court of appeals' opinion did not conflict with Bernal and that the
court did not have "conflicts jurisdiction" to review the certification
order.10 4
In In re Jobe Concrete Products, Inc.,105 the El Paso Court of Appeals
found that consolidation of 850 plaintiffs was not proper and granted
mandamus relief in a suit alleging personal injuries and property damage
arising from exposure to noise and emissions from Jobe's rock crushing
and concrete facility. The original lawsuit was filed by three plaintiffs,
who later filed amended petitions adding 847 additional plaintiffs.10 6 The
trial court denied Jobe's motion to strike all 847 additional plaintiffs or to
sever those plaintiffs for a separate trial.'0 7 Jobe filed a petition for writ
of mandamus. The court of appeals found that intervention was proper
because all the plaintiffs resided near the Jobe facility and were exposed
to the effects of blasting at the facility, 10 8 but the appellate court ordered
the claims to be severed into individual cause numbers for separate tri-
als.' 0 9 Although the plaintiffs' claims shared common questions of law,
the exposures to noise and emitted substances, the timing of the expo-
sures, the type of injuries suffered, and the causation of those injuries
would vary from plaintiff to plaintiff.110 The court concluded that
"[g]iven the absence of any identifiable advantage to joinder of these
98. Id. at *14-15.
99. Id. at *16.
100. Id. at *17.
101. Id. at *18.
102. Id. at *18-19.
103. Id. at *19.
104. Id. at *19-22 (O'Neill, J., dissenting).
105. In re Jobe Concrete Prods., Inc., No. 08-01-00351-CV (Tex. App.-El Paso Dec. 6,
2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2001 WL 1555656, at *1.
106. Id.
107. Id. at *2.
108. Id. at *5.
109. Id. at *9.
110. Id. at *8.
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claims and the existence of tremendous potential for prejudice, severance
is required to prevent manifest injustice."11' The court cautioned, how-
ever, that its opinion "should not be read as prohibiting [the trial court]
from consolidating certain claims of the additional plaintiffs into appro-
priate trial units."1 12
B. DISCOVERY AND CASE MANAGEMENT
In In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 13 the Texas Supreme Court condi-
tionally granted a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to allow
discovery to proceed in a suit brought by 448 workers who alleged that
they had sustained injuries as a result of exposure to "toxic soup" created
by the use of chemicals at the Parker-Hannifin Corporation processing
plant in McAllen, Texas. 114 The plaintiffs sued more than fifty manufac-
turers, suppliers, and distributors of chemical products to the plant.11 5
The defendants propounded an interrogatory to all plaintiffs seeking the
names of physicians who could provide evidentiary support for the plain-
tiffs' allegation regarding causation of their injuries, 16 and the plaintiffs
uniformly answered that they did not recall. 117 The trial court then re-
stricted discovery to a group of twenty plaintiffs selected for trial by
plaintiffs' counsel and ordered that all discovery be limited to those
twenty plaintiffs' claims.'' 8
The defendants sought mandamus relief from the order restricting dis-
covery. The court denied relief so the trial court could reconsider its or-
der in light of the court's intervening decision in In re Colonial Pipeline
Co.,119 in which the court held that a "similar abatement of discovery was
a clear abuse of discretion."' 120 After the supreme court issued its order,
the trial court designated a new group of twenty-five plaintiffs for trial
but did not order plaintiffs to provide a substantive answer to the interro-
gatory regarding causation. The trial court also refused to allow any dis-
covery regarding the claims of plaintiffs who were not in the group of
twenty-five trial plaintiffs. 121 The defendants again sought mandamus re-
lief, and the court of appeals agreed that the trial court had abused its
discretion by refusing to require the twenty-five trial plaintiffs to answer
the causation interrogatory but refused to disturb the trial court's order
abating other discovery.122
111. Id.
112. Id. at *9 n.13.
113. In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 62 S.W.3d 197, 198 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam).




118. Id. at 199.
119. In re Colonial Pipeline Co., 968 S.W.2d 938, 943 (Tex. 1998).
120. In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 62 S.W.3d at 199.
121. Id. at 199-200.
122. Id. at 200.
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The supreme court granted mandamus to order the trial court to permit
the requested discovery. The court acknowledged that "a trial court must
be given latitude in managing discovery and preparing a case for trial,
especially a case as complex as this," but noted that such latitude is not
unlimited.' 2 3 It observed that a "blanket abatement of discovery cannot
be justified by the goal of an orderly trial process when not one plaintiff
has yet gone to trial" and cautioned that "the parties now face the very
real threat that after seven years evidence will be destroyed, witnesses
will die or disappear, and memories will be impaired."' 124
The supreme court additionally noted that the trial court's restriction
on discovery prevented it from selecting an appropriate group of cases to
try.' 25 The court pointed out that its decisions in In re Ethyl Corp.126 and
In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. 127 established the factors to be considered
in determining whether cases should be consolidated for trial. Without
discovery regarding the entire group of cases, the trial court could not
determine whether the factors permitting consolidation were satisfied.' 28
Consequently, the Texas Supreme Court ordered the trial court to permit
discovery concerning all plaintiffs' claims without further delay and then
to determine how the claims will be tried in compliance with Ethyl and
Bristol-Myers.12
9
In In re The Lincoln Electric Co.,' 30 the Beaumont Court of Appeals
held that a defendant in a multi-party toxic tort case had not waived its
privilege objections to the plaintiffs' discovery requests by failing to as-
sert the objections in its first discovery responses. In response to a dis-
covery request, the defendant filed objections and motions for protective
orders but did not assert privilege.' 3' Only after the trial court overruled
the objections did the defendant assert the attorney-client and work
product privileges.' 32 After the trial court ruled that the privileges had
been waived, the defendant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. The
court of appeals rejected the contention that the defendant had waived its
privilege objection by initially making other objections to the plaintiff's
requests, pointing to the "overall spirit of non-waiver apparent in the ap-
plicable discovery rules."'1 33 The court conditionally granted the petition
for writ of mandamus, requiring the trial court to consider the merits of
the defendant's privilege objections. 34 Justice Burgess dissented, arguing
that "the making of frivolous objections should not extend the time when
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 201.
126. In re Ethyl Corp., 975 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. 1998).
127. In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 975 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. 1998).
128. In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 62 S.W.3d at 201.
129. Id.
130. In re Lincoln Elec. Co., 91 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, orig.
proceeding).
131. Id. at 433-35.
132. Id. at 434.
133. Id at 437.
134. Id. at 438.
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Lincoln was required to assert its privileges." 135
In Baker v. Monsanto Co., 13 6 the Houston Court of Appeals for the
First District affirmed a summary judgment for a defendant in a toxic tort
case after the intervening plaintiffs failed to timely serve the defendant.
The original plaintiffs sued several defendants including Monsanto, alleg-
ing personal injury and property damage caused by a Superfund site. 137
Before the original plaintiffs served Monsanto with citation, the interven-
ors filed their petition in intervention and sent it to Monsanto via certi-
fied mail. t 38 Monsanto refused service because it had not been served
with citation, and the intervenors made no further attempt at service. 139
Two years later, the trial court granted Monsanto's motion for summary
judgment asserting limitations as an affirmative defense against the inter-
venors. 140 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that because Monsanto
was not yet a party to the underlying suit when the intervenors attempted
service, the intervenors were required to serve Monsanto with citation
personally rather than serve them by certified mail. 141 Therefore, the at-
tempted service was defective, and the appellants could not show due
diligence in procuring service upon Monsanto. 142 The intervenors argued
that Monsanto waived any defect in service by filing an answer and mo-
tion for summary judgment in the underlying lawsuit. 143 The court of
appeals rejected this argument, holding that Monsanto's answer was di-
rected specifically to the original plaintiffs who had properly served Mon-
santo and that its motion for summary judgment was made after
limitations had run on the intervenors' claims. 144 Finding no waiver, the
court overruled these issues and affirmed the summary judgment. 45
C. FEDERAL REMOVAL JURISDICTION
With increasing frequency, defendants in mass tort cases have sought to
move cases from state to federal courts as part of a strategy to achieve
global resolution of the litigation through multidistrict transfer, a nation-
wide class action, or bankruptcy. In Arnold v. Garlock, Inc., 14 6 the Fifth
Circuit disapproved a systematic effort to remove and consolidate asbes-
tos claims in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5), a provision al-
lowing related tort claims to be tried in the district court where a
bankruptcy is pending. While acknowledging that certain mass tort
135. Id. at 438-39 (Burgess, J., dissenting).










145. Id. at 481-82.
146. Arnold v. Garlock, Inc., 278 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2001).
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claims in some circumstances might be consolidated with bankruptcy pro-
ceedings in a single district in accordance with § 157(b)(5), the court con-
cluded that such a transfer was not appropriate in the context of asbestos
litigation. 47
Garlock, a manufacturer of asbestos-containing gaskets, was one of nu-
merous defendants in many asbestos-related personal injury and wrong-
ful death claims pending in Texas state courts. After one of its co-
defendants, Federal-Mogul, Inc., filed for bankruptcy protection,'148 Gar-
lock removed thirty-seven asbestos cases pending in state courts in Aus-
tin, Beaumont, Corpus Christi, Dallas, Galveston, Paris, and San Antonio
to the federal courts in the respective districts. 149 To support the remov-
als, Garlock argued that its contribution claims against Federal-Mogul
were "related to" the tort claims against Federal-Mogul within the mean-
ing of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), which gives federal courts jurisdiction over
civil proceedings "arising in or related to" bankruptcy proceedings. 150
Garlock moved to transfer each of the cases to the District of Delaware,
where the Federal-Mogul bankruptcy was pending, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(5). 15 '
The federal district courts generally rejected Garlock's theory of re-
moval jurisdiction. Some of the courts simply remanded the cases out-
right for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, while others took additional
procedural steps, such as dismissing the claims against Federal-Mogul
with prejudice, severing claims against Federal-Mogul and transferring
those claims to the District of Delaware, or remanding for equitable rea-
sons under 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b). 152 The net result in each case was that
claims against Garlock and the other non-bankrupt manufacturers were
returned to state court. The Fifth Circuit then issued a temporary stay of
these orders to allow it to consider the propriety of the removals. 153
In a lengthy opinion, the Fifth Circuit declined to permit the claims to
remain in federal court by extending the temporary stay. The court noted
that the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision 5 4 is "rarely ... a
valid basis on which to stay actions against non-debtors."'155 The court
also held that the ten-day stay of judgments under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 62(a) does not apply to remand orders.156 With respect to
Garlock's request for a stay pending appeal of the denial of transfer
147. Id. at 444.
148. In October 2001, Federal-Mogul filed for bankruptcy on behalf of itself and its
affiliates and subsidiaries, including Gasket Holdings, Inc., which was the successor to
Flexitallic, another gasket manufacturer. Id. at 431, 439.
149. Id. at 432.
150. See id. at 431-36.
151. Id. at 431.
152. Id. at 432.
153. Id. at 433.
154. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1993).
155. Arnold, 278 F.2d at 436 (citing Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp., 706 F.2d 54t, 544
(5th Cir. 1983)).
156. Id. at 437.
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under § 157(b)(5), the court concluded that Garlock had not shown suffi-
cient probability of success on appeal to justify a stay. In part, this deci-
sion was based on the court's conclusion that Garlock had no valid
contribution claim against Federal-Mogul "upon which to assert 'related
to' jurisdiction under the bankruptcy laws."' 157 With respect to the cases
in which the claims against Federal-Mogul were dismissed with prejudice,
the court held that Texas law foreclosed any contribution claims.' 58 Even
in cases in which the Federal-Mogul claims had not been dismissed, the
court found that Garlock's "universally-pled claims against all defendants
in all asbestos lawsuits in which Garlock appears as a co-defendant" were
insufficient to justify a transfer under § 157(b)(5). 159
The court distinguished A.H. Robbins v. Piccinin16° and In re Dow
Corning,161 two mass tort cases in which courts authorized transfers
under § 157(b)(5). A.H. Robbins involved the Dalkon Shield litigation,
in which the co-defendants were "employees or other close associates
who were contractually indemnified by Robins. ' 162 The court contrasted
this with asbestos litigation, in which "the various co-defendants manu-
facture, use, specify, or handle many different asbestos products without
such close relationship. ' 163 The Dow Corning case involved breast im-
plant litigation, in which the co-defendants were "closely involved in us-
ing the same material, originating with the debtor, to make the same,
singular product, sold to the same market and incurring substantially sim-
ilar injuries.' 1 64 The result was a "unity of identity between the debtor
and the co-defendants not present here, where the co-defendants vari-
ously use asbestos for brake friction products, insulation, gaskets, and
other uses."'165 While holding that consolidation under § 157(b)(5) was
inappropriate in the context of asbestos litigation, the court explicitly re-
fused to preclude such consolidation in other mass tort cases, depending
on "the relationship or unity of identity of the co-defendants and the
debtor(s), the uniformity of source of the injury or wrongful death, and
the general status of pending cases in the state courts and the effect a
consolidation would have on them. ' 166
In addition to finding that Garlock had failed to demonstrate a
probability of success on the merits, the court held that a stay would sub-
stantially harm the other parties. The court explained that "delay where
plaintiffs have mesothelioma, asbestosis, or pleural disease, or where de-
cedents' survivors await compensation for support substantially harms
those parties" and that "lengthy interruption of state court proceedings
157. Id. at 433.
158. Id. at 439.
159. Id. at 440.
160. A.H. Robbins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986).
161. In re Dow Corning, 86 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 1996).




166. Id. at 440 n.12.
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already in progress for months or years may substantially harm the ability
of the state courts to resolve the cases. 1 67 In discussing whether the stay
would serve the public interest, the court observed that "[i]n a mass tort
case of the scope of asbestos litigation, transferring cases related to a
bankruptcy could well result in depriving the states of cognizance over
thousands of cases .... The negative effect on comity between the federal
and state court systems must be given some account. '168
Garlock also argued that transfer under § 157(b)(5) would provide a
centralized forum for decisions that could be given "preclusive effect in
future actions. '169 The court noted that the manufacturers of asbestos
brake products were advancing this proposal in Delaware, arguing that
consolidation would enable the court to hold comprehensive Daubert
hearings to determine the admissibility of expert testimony. 170 The court
concluded that such arguments faced "formidable obstacles. ' 171 The
court explained that "no matter how creative the procedural avenue, and
in spite of the fact that this litigation would benefit from a uniform ap-
proach, at almost every turn this circuit has rejected attempts at aggrega-
tion and issue preclusion in asbestos cases .... [W]e refused to tolerate
deviation from fundamental principles of due process simply because as-
bestos cases threatened to swamp the resources of the federal courts."'1 72
167. Id. at 441.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 442.
170. See id. at 442 n.15 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589).
171. Arnold, 278 F.3d at 442. The Third Circuit subsequently reached the same conclu-
sion. See In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., 300 F.3d 368, 390 (3d Cir. 2002) ("Arguably, a
procedure authorizing the aggregation of state court cases, such as the Friction Product
Claims, into a nationwide class action would provide a mechanism for a Daubert hearing
like the one Defendants seek, but such proposals, frequently made, have not passed both
houses of Congress."), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 884 (2003).
172. Arnold, 278 F.3d at 443.
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